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Abstract  
 
Contrary to Popper’s classic paper with this title, it can be 
argued that the principal failure of Western analyses of communism 
was not the failure to predict the collapse of most of the 
communist regimes in and around 1989 but more a failure of 
prophecy, in the sense of a more speculative theory of the 
contradictions of those regimes and their unsustainability.     
The reasons can be found in the polarisation between overblown 
theories of totalitarianism and excessively bland comparative 
approaches couched in terms of the, then popular, theories of 
industrial society and, often, convergence.  There were also 
methodological reasons arising from the positivist shibboleths of 
factual documentation, with the consequence that dubious 
statistics were considered better than none, and value-freedom.   
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This article is a partial response to the claim by Klaus von 
Beyme (1994:35; 1996:6) that the collapse of state socialism was a 
‘black Friday’ for the social sciences and their methodology.1  
Writing in the aftermath of the credit crunch, it is salutary to 
compare the failure to predict that catastrophe with the failure 
to predict the collapse of most of the communist regimes in and 
around 1989.2  The British Queen’s question, “Why wasn’t one 
told?”, is also relevant to 1989. In both cases, however, the 
point is not (except for the speculators) to predict the precise 
                                                 
1
  Adam Przeworski (1991:1) wrote in similar terms of “a dismal 
failure of political science.” See also Tarrow, 1991. Since 
writing this paper we have been able to read a recent article by 
Antoni Sułek (2009) which complements our analysis from a Polish 
perspective; Poland was of course much better placed than most 
other parts of the bloc (Bafoil, 1991; Mespoulet, 2009). We take 
up here some of the themes of the first chapter of Outhwaite and 
Ray, 2004.  
2
  The Guardian of 26 January 2009 lists just six commentators 
“who saw it [the credit crunch] coming,” including the economist 
Nouriel Roubini and the speculators Warren Buffett and George 
Soros; one could add a few journalists such as Will Hutton, but 
again a tiny minority. 
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moment of the collapse,3 but more a failure of something like what 
Karl Popper called prophecy, in the sense of a more analytical and 
at the same time speculative theory of the contradictions of those 
regimes and their unsustainability.4 Whereas Popper (1948) argued 
                                                 
3
  Randall Collins claimed to have predicted the collapse in 
his book on Weberian sociology, but he does so in only quite 
general terms (Collins, 1986). There was also a timely special 
issue of Studies in Comparative Communism (1989), based on a 
conference held in 1987, on ‘Leadership Drift’ in the USSR, 
Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary.  Robert Hutchings (1989:9) closed 
his introduction to the papers with the prospect of power-sharing: 
“there is a way out of leadership drift, but the Communist regimes 
of Eastern Europe may not like it.” Valerie Bunce (1999: xii) 
aimed “to challenge the recent assumption that the knowledge 
accumulated about European socialism over the course of the cold 
war period was deficient, because specialists failed to anticipate 
the events of 1989 and afterwards.” We should also mention as an 
early futurological exercise by the Soviet dissident Andei Amalrik 
(1970): Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? As von Beyme 
(1994:27) notes, Amalrik was only a year out in his prediction of 
the beginning of the end.  
4
  Katherine Verdery (1995:30) offered a retrospective hint at 
such an analysis, writing of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ division in state 
socialism: “To phrase it in Gramscian terms, the lived experience 
of people in socialism precluded its utopian discourse from 
 4 
that the social sciences should eschew speculative prophecy and 
stick to testable predictions, we are inclined to suggest 
something more like the opposite in relation to the analysis of 
state socialism.  
 
 There is, of course, a long and ignoble history of euphoria 
and punch-pulling in Western accounts of communism, fed by an even 
longer history of Potemkin villages tarted up to impress visitors.  
As Žižek (2001:95) stated,  
 
for Western Leftists, Eastern dissidents were all too naïve 
in their belief in democracy – in their rejection of 
Socialism, they unknowingly threw the baby out with the 
bathwater; in the eyes of the dissidents, the Western Left 
played patronizing games with them, disavowing the true 
harshness of the totalitarian regime 
  
The Webbs’ book is one of the most notorious scholarly examples in 
English; in France, with its extremely orthodox communist party, 
there were many more.5  Within serious academic studies of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
becoming hegemonic – precluded that is, the softening of coercion 
with consent.” For classic analyses of ‘them’, see Voslensky 
(1984) and Toranska (1987). 
5
 See, for example, the chapters by Auer and Rabinbach in Fleck et 
al 2009. 
 5 
communism, however, the lines of division are much more nuanced, 
and methodological considerations as well as political concerns 
play a much larger part.6  It was not so much a matter of 
portraying communist societies in glowing colours as of 
relativising their obvious defects in the interests of comparative 
method, value-freedom, and so forth, accompanied by a desire not 
to be seen to line up in the ranks of the cold warriors.  As we 
note below, Alfred Meyer (1991:136) blamed the failure to forecast 
1989 on  
 
cold-war hysteria, knee-jerk anti-anti-communism, and the 
blindness of dominant social science methodologies to non-
Western cultures.”   
 
These three elements form in a sense theframe for this article.7       
 
      
 
                                                 
6
  As von Beyme (1994:17) wrote (our translation), “There were 
undoubtedly fellow-travellers and apologists of actually existing 
socialism in the West.  But their mistakes are relatively 
uninteresting.  It is more important to investigate the reasons 
for misjudgements in the positivist mainstream.” 
7
  See p.00 below. 
 6 
In what follows we will focus on mainstream literature rather 
than that inspired by Maoist or Trotskyist approaches, even though 
these were often among the more substantial contributions – 
notably the massive studies by Isaac Deutscher and Charles 
Bettelheim or shorter discussions by, for example, Tony Cliff or 
Hillel Ticktin.  The mainstream was sometimes influenced by 
Marxism or Weberianism (the latter, for example, in the 
influential work of Raymond Aron in France and Frank Parkin in the 
UK), but more usually by a diffuse functionalism or an empiricism 
which deliberately eschewed theoretical baggage.   
 
 Functionalism, we are often told, and with some reason, is 
intrinsically uncritical and prone to endorse any existing system.  
Alvin Gouldner (1971) pointed to the parallels between US 
functionalism and Soviet Marxism-Leninism as parallel programmes 
legitimating their respective societies.  So far as US 
functionalists looked at all at the USSR and other communist 
societies, however, they tend to line up at the more critical end 
of the spectrum.  Talcott Parsons, in terms which recur throughout 
this literature, stressed both that “the main forces of social 
change are making for convergence” between capitalist and 
socialist industrialism (Parsons 1964a:390) and that social 
differentiation in modern societies undermined central control 
 7 
(Parsons 1964a:397-8).8  Thus communist societies, he predicted (in 
a sense rightly), would “either make adjustments in the direction 
of electoral democracy and a plural party system or 'regress' into 
generally less advanced and politically less effective forms of 
organization” (Parsons 1964b:356; cf. Lane 1996:146-7). Carl J. 
Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, authors of one of the most 
influential texts of the early postwar period (Friedrich and 
Brzezinski 1966), were certainly not inclined to punch-pulling.   
 
 The same is true of communist studies or Sovietology more 
specifically.  Merle Fainsod’s How Russia is Ruled (1953) was one 
of the leading examples of the totalitarianism model.  The opening 
sentence declares that “The aim of this book is to analyze the 
physiology, as well as the anatomy, of Soviet totalitarianism” 
(ibid.:ix), and the book ends with the declaration that “The 
totalitarian regime does not shed its police-state 
characteristics; it dies when power is wrenched from its hands” 
(ibid.:500).  Fainsod applied this analysis, enriched with a 
wealth of material on everyday life, in Smolensk Under Soviet Rule 
(1958; 1989).9  In this book, based on Party archives seized in the 
                                                 
8
  See also Lane (1996:146-7).  The theme of differentiation 
plays a large part in the literature both before and after 
1989/1991. 
9
  This archive was exceptionally valuable, since material of 
this sort was not available to researchers until nearly fifty 
 8 
Nazi occupation, he concluded that the totalitarian machinery 
worked partly because if its “imperfections”.  There 
was”widespread mass discontent,” and “there was little that went 
on in even the most obscure corner of Smolensk that the secret 
police did not know” (1989:449).  
 
Paradoxically, it was the very inefficiency of the state 
machine which helped make it tolerable.  Had the Smolensk 
proconsuls functioned as a perfect instrument of the center 
and been able always to exact the heavy tribute which Moscow 
demanded, the price in terms of suffering and the possible 
dangers to the regime in terms of stiffening resistance would 
have been far greater than they actually were.  The failures 
of the local representatives of state power provided an 
escape valve which did much to ensure that mass indignation 
did not boil over.  Thus the imperfections of the regional 
control system helped to alleviate tension.   (1989:450) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
years later, after the end of the Soviet Union. In the intervening 
period, there was considerable reliance on exile memoirs, such as 
that by the former apparatchik Viktor Kravchenko (1947) and on 
studies based on interviews with exiles. Exile studies were also 
of course hardly likely to convey a favourable impression of the 
regimes left behind, though they did reveal elements of nostalgia 
for the socialist collective and for the homeland more generally.   
 9 
Fainsod went on to explain the relative stability of the regime in 
terms of two further elements: “the tradition of servility to 
authority inherited from the Russian past” and the opportunities 
for social advancement created by the Revolution: “it tapped fresh 
talent from the lower depths of society and harnessed it to the 
revolutionary chariot” (1989:451).   Whatever one makes of this 
analysis fifty years on,10 it is clear that Fainsod was not naïvely 
accepting that Soviet totalitarian aspirations were being 
fulfilled: he concluded “that the totalitarian facade concealed a 
host of inner contradictions, that the yoke which Communism 
imposed left its legacy of smoldering grievances, and that the 
suppressed aspirations of yesterday may yet become the seedbed of 
tomorrow’s fierce debates”(ibid.:454). In a volume edited by 
Friedrich, one of the leading theorists of totalitarianism, Karl 
Deutsch (1954:332) explicitly addressed the issue of the decline 
                                                 
10
  Daniel Brower, in his introduction to the 1989 edition, 
delicately deconstructs the totalitarian model. A posthumous 
revised edition of How Russia is Ruled, more blandly retitled How 
the Soviet Union is Governed and authored by Jerry Hough, 
apparently annoyed those who continued to uphold the totalitarian 
model (Gleason, 1995:265 n.66). Stephen Kotkin (1995:489 n.6) 
comments wryly on the debates over the acceptance of Stalinism: 
“It seems that no one likes to characterize admiration for 
dictatorship as a rational choice exercised by conscious 
individuals.” 
 10
of totalitarian systems.  In what now seems one of the more 
perceptive predictions, he suggested that “we might well expect 
the 1970s or 1980s to bring…a diminution in 'classic' patterns of 
totalitarian behaviour.”   
 
 In the 1960s, the ‘totalitarian’ model which, as we have 
seen, was more nuanced than it may appear at first sight, was 
confronted by, for example, work by Gordon Skilling on interest 
groups in the USSR and by Jerry Hough (1969) on the Soviet 
administrative system.11  Academic exchanges and field work became 
more common,12 and as Gleason (1995:131) suggests, “although a year 
in the Soviet Union usually had a devastating effect on leftist, 
                                                 
11
  Defenders of the totalitarian model, such as the Polish 
exile Leszek Kołakowski, could of course question this 
implication. Kołakowski wrote, in a contribution to a 1983 volume 
on totalitarianism, “Among arguments purporting to do away with 
the concept of 'totalitarianism', the most absurd says that the 
Soviet Union, for instance, is in fact a 'pluralist' system 
because there are always cliques or particular groups vying for 
power and influence in the establishment.  If this is a symptom of 
pluralism, then the concept is useless and indeed quite 
meaningless, since all political regimes throughout all history 
have been 'pluralist' in this sense.” (Kołakowski 2005:66).   
12
  One of us made his first visit to the Soviet Union on a 
school trip in 1966. 
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pro-Soviet opinions, it also undermined the totalitarian model.” 
An influential book, The Red Executive (Granick 1979), pointed up 
the parallels between West and East.    
 
 The concept of totalitarianism, with its emphasis on state 
terror, tended to become an ideal type from which later 
divergences were measured.  Though few commentators were naive 
enough to believe that everything changed after Stalin’s death in 
1953 or with Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ of 1956, there was a 
growing consensus in many Western countries that the term 
totalitarianism could no longer be applied in a strong sense, and 
that something else was needed to explain a ‘post-totalitarian’ 
reality - at which point the ideas of industrial society and 
convergence took up the strain. (As noted earlier in relation to 
Parsons, the two had already coexisted to a substantial degree.)  
Brzezinski, one of the leading theorists of totalitarianism in the 
USSR, had set it in a comparative perspective (Brzezinski and 
Huntington 1965).  Three other major theorists of the USSR who 
were at the centre of a major refugee study, the Harvard Interview 
Project, Inkeles, Bauer and Kluckhohn (1956:26) conceptualised it 
as both totalitarian and an industrial society: ”In many respects, 
the social organization of the Soviet Union resembles that of the 
large-scale industrial societies of the West.”  As Mark Edele 
(2007:354) comments,  
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Within the basic categorial framework of Inkeles, Bauer and 
Kluckhohn, then, many of the later discussions of historians 
could have unfolded: totalitarians and revisionists simply 
focussed on different parts of the equation, the former 
stressing state attempts and the latter ‘Soviet 
complications’.  Similarly, many of the post-revisionist 
debates – such as the polemic between ‘modernists’ and ‘neo-
traditionalists’, or the return of the concept of 
‘totalitarianism’ – look like an unfolding of the conceptual 
triangle of the ‘Soviet totalitarian-industrial society’.  
 
Two typical examples of these controversies can be found in the 
Slavic Review (1961) and, a quarter of a century later and 
focussed on Stalinism, in the Russian Review (1986).  In the first 
of these, Alfred Meyer made an early attempt to deflate 
Brzezinski’s totalitarian model with the aid of comparisons with 
Wright Mills’ analysis of the US.  After 1989/1991, in an article 
quoted in our introductory remarks, Meyer (1991) reflected on  
 
…why scholarship on Soviet politics and society had such a 
poor record of forecasting the most recent developments…one 
might conclude that I blame this seeming failure on the 
intrusion of political ideologies into our research: cold-war 
hysteria, knee-jerk anti-anti-communism, and the blindness of 
 13
dominant social science methodologies to non-Western 
cultures.13 
 
Most important of all was however the comparative and 
contextualising imperative.  Raymond Aron, on the moderate right 
in the French context, was unapologetic in using the term 
totalitarian to describe Soviet-type societies, which he saw as 
undergoing a process of routinisation (Aron 1965).14 He also 
stressed the context of industrial society stating “at a time when 
science is universal and means of production are similar in every 
industrial economy, it would be as unreasonable to deny all 
resemblance between the Soviet and Western types of societies as 
to claim…that industrialism will culminate both here and there in 
the same civilisation” (Aron 1967:2).    
 
                                                 
13
  He goes on to conclude that “politics and methodology 
inevitably are intertwined” and to argue for “methodological 
pluralism."  Thomas Remington (1995:180) similarly commented that 
“the common knowledge of Sovietology can be faulted for a 
theoretical bias in the direction of stability.”    
14
  He was one of the first to point to the tension between the 
imperatives of control and liberalisation: “…le régime de parti 
unique…est à la fois trop despotique pour ce qu’il veut avoir de 
libéral, trop libéral pour ce qu’il veut conserver de despotique” 
(Aron 1965:16). 
 14
 As David Lane (2007:174) has written in a judicious 
retrospective,  
 
The major fault in the totalitarian conception is that it 
reduces all social life to dependency on the political.  It 
is similar in character to Marxist accounts, except that 
Marxist ones reduce phenomena to an economic base…In neither 
Marxism nor totalitarianism does civil society, set between 
individual and the state, play an important role. 
My own approach is to conceive of social differentiation as 
being part of urban industrial society, whether it be state 
socialist or capitalist.15 
 
It was probably considerations of empirical sustainability which 
did most to blunt the edge of social scientific analysis of state 
socialism, dependent as they largely were on official statistics 
and other material. In the German case, the work of Peter 
Christian Lutz on the Party elite (1968) inspired a number of 
                                                 
15
  Lane points to the implications of this approach for 
contemporary research.  “In this paradigm, rather than 
'totalitarianism' leaving a vacuum in which civil society had to 
be constructed, on the contrary, post communist societies 
inherited embedded structures with which the imposition of a 
Western type of civil society had to contend.” (Lane 2007:195)  
 15
other studies.16  Again, the notion of ‘system comparison’ 
(Systemvergleich) could operate either as a vehicle of state 
propaganda, as it did in both German states, or as a principle of 
scholarly analysis – with the danger in the latter case that it 
tended to blur fundamental differences for the sake of making the 
comparison.17   
                                                 
16
  As Jarausch (1999:55) comments, however,”Unfortunately, much 
of this data is fundamentally flawed, since it is based more on 
official SED rhetoric than actual empirical evidence. Advocates of 
totalitarianism theory could therefore criticize this approach, 
particularly after 1989-90 and accuse those who sought to compare 
the FRG and GDR systems of overlooking fundamental differences 
between democracy and dictatorship, and abandoning the cause of 
unification.” 
17
  One of the best studies in English of the two German states, 
that by Jaroslav Krejci (1976), takes them as “exemplary forms of 
two fairly successful systems” (1976:212).  Yet he also makes the 
point that “There are only two countries where the Marxist-
Leninist brand of socialism can be considered as the successor to 
a genuine capitalist formation: East Germany and Czechoslovakia” 
(1976:10). This has implications for modernisation theories of 
socialism.  The notion of a modernising dictatorship, which has 
considerable mileage in relation to the USSR and much of the bloc, 
is hardly relevant to the GDR (though it did form a substantial 
part of its self-image). For the GDR, it was clear from as early 
 16
 
 Communism was also, of course, a moving target.  The regime 
of the USSR was well established by the early 1950s, and for close 
observers the hysterical purges there and in the satellites were 
an alarming spectacle,18 but the Eastern European dictatorships had 
not been in power long,19 before the death of Stalin in 1953 
promised, and to some extent delivered, a thaw.  Economic reforms 
then and in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that reform was always 
on the agenda, even it was often deferred or aborted.20  The same 
can be said perhaps for the attempts at political reform in 1953, 
1956, 1968 and so on. These systems vacillated between ‘plan’ and 
‘market’ and between relative liberalization and purges more or 
less from the 1920s onwards (Ray 1996:120-25). Each of these dates 
could be read either as pointing to the unreformability of the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
as the late 1950s that the best modernisation strategy for the 
country would have been to give up and hand over the keys to the 
Bundeskanzler. On the theme of modernization, see for example 
Pollack, 1999. 
18
  There is an interesting analysis in Gadourek, 1953. 
19
  Andrew Gyorgy (1954:381), in a comment at the end of 
Friedrich’s conference volume, described the Eastern European 
satellites as ‘partialitarian (semi-totalitarian)’.  The 
contemporary satellite state reflects totalitarianism in its 
formative stages.”  
20
  For an analysis of this context, see Meuschel, 2000. 
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system or, alternatively, to the possibility that next time would 
be different and the reforms might succeed – whatever that might 
mean in practice for ‘feasible socialism’ (Nove 1991).21  
 
 The outcome of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in particular 
showed both the impossibility of a radical rupture and, in 
retrospect, the relatively benign face of Kadar’s goulash 
communism.22  Even the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, a 
propaganda own goal for communism if ever there was one, was 
accompanied by some careful and modest economic reforms (Kaiser 
1999) and led to a degree of stabilisation and prosperity, 
especially in the early 1970s (Roesler 2007:219).  There was also 
something of a cross-over effect, that as commentators from the 
left bemoaned the loss of idealism, the decline in social mobility 
and the technocratisation of the elites, more centrist observers 
saw these same trends as signs of normalisation and convergence 
                                                 
21
  As Sigrid Meuschel (1993:420) noted, the outcome in 1989 
demonstrates that the search for endogenous tendencies in the 
direction of change „was not mistaken in principle.“ See also 
Ettrich, 2005:100-101.  
22
  It was also used by Kadar himself and by others, such as 
Ulbricht in Germany, to motivate a crack-down.  Alfred 
Kantorowicz, who later emigrated from East to West Germany, wrote 
in his diary that “Hungary was for Ulbricht what the Reichstag 
fire had been for Hitler” (cited in Torpey, 1995:46).  
 18
towards something resembling Western and increasingly global 
capitalism. 
 
 The 1980s saw something of a revival of totalitarianism as a 
model, partly in the neoconservative rhetoric of the Reagan 
administration but also, more interestingly, in the work of 
internal or recent exiles.  The East German Rudolf Bahro (1978) 
was not yet in exile, nor yet in prison, when he wrote The 
Alternative.  Two Hungarian dissidents, György Konrád and Ivan 
Szelényi (1979), developed a controversial analysis of communism 
as rule by an intellectual class. This was followed by their 
exiled compatriots Fehér, Heller and Márkus’ Dictatorship Over 
Needs (1983).  These books, paralleled in France by Claude Lefort 
(1981), initiated a trend towards more critical and speculative 
theorizing about communism. In Poland, Jadwiga Staniszkis followed 
in 1984 with her book on Solidarity and, retrospectively, The 
Ontology of Socialism (1992).  Among Western thinkers, the 
Hungarian American Andrew Arato (1982) brought Frankfurt critical 
theory to bear on state socialism and Jeffrey Goldfarb (1989) 
examined the ‘post-totalitarian mind’.  Dictatorship Over Needs 
was probably the watershed in studies of state socialism, bringing 
a new critical and analytic approach to bear on a system whose 
prospects seemed still open.  The authors declined to offer any 
predictions:  
 
 19
Of course, no one possesses prophetic capacities and the 
highly covert, fetishistic processes of life in Eastern 
European societies make even normally predictive assessments 
very difficult.  The possibility of a revolution…can never be 
totally excluded, but precisely because of the mysterious 
character of gestation of any revolution, it is anybody’s 
guess and not a matter of sociological consideration whether 
it will come or not.  (ibid.:297) 
 
Completing their book in the aftermath of the repression of 
Solidarity in Poland, the authors suggest that this kind of 
opposition and the regimes’ authoritarian responses will probably 
“be the way of life of most Eastern European countries in the next 
decade, with the possible upshot that all this could contribute to 
the inner erosion of the Soviet centre of domination itself” 
(ibid.:297). 
 Meanwhile Gorbachev was initiating the changes which 
destabilized the whole system. It is this as much as anything 
which explains and largely excuses the failure of commentators to 
predict the collapse, since nothing guaranteed that he would 
become General Secretary or behave as he did.23 Without this, the 
                                                 
23
  As Peter Reddaway (1991, section 3) wrote, in a review of 
recent literature, “The dominant approach within Western 
Sovietology, especially during the last five years, tended to 
assume that the Soviet system was moving toward a humane form of 
 20
communist order might well have survived for another decade or 
more.  It is this fundamental ambiguity, what Sigrid Meuschel 
(1992) “the paradox of stability and revolution24,” which 
                                                                                                                                                                 
socialism which would involve a market for socialist enterprise. 
Until very recently, many Western Sovietologists did not even 
contemplate the possibility that the Communist party might be so 
unpopular that its rule would soon be threatened, or that ethnic 
nationalism might become a potent, let alone an uncontainable 
force. They often held that an implicit 'social contract' had 
evolved between the Party and a partner called 'the Soviet 
people', a contract that provided a firm basis for evolution 
toward a better socialist future. When Gorbachev appeared with an 
explicit program of this sort, such Sovietologists made clear 
their belief that the West must support him in every possible way.  
The writings in which they did so did not usually help us to 
prepare for the upheavals of last year.” 
24
  Meuschel was writing specifically about Germany, but with 
reference to the broader context of “the disastrous effects of 
socialism of the Soviet type in general” (Meuschel, 1992:7).  Her 
model which, like that of Arato (1982), drew on Habermas’s model 
of legitimation, is also relevant to the other socialist 
countries. Habermas himself, in a comment on Arato’s analysis, 
neatly captured a crucial way in which state socialism differed 
from capitalism: ”…in place of the reification of communicative 
relations [through money and administrative power (RWO and LR)], 
 21
bedevilled not just prediction but, more fundamentally, 
contemporary and subsequent analysis of communist systems.  
 Current controversies, despite hindsight, vastly improved 
access to sources and so on, are still shaped by many of the same 
conceptual dilemmas as in the forty inglorious years dominated by 
the export model of Soviet socialism. Detlef Pollack (1999:28) 
brings this out in relation to Germany:  
  
The GDR should neither be primarily defined as a society of 
work (which it also was), nor as a community of values, e.g. 
as a socialist experiment or a culture with long-term 
ideological objectives, but as a deeply divided and fissured 
society, essentially conflicted and contradictory.  This term 
is meant to express the fact that the specific tensions 
running through GDR society were just as destructive as they 
were unavoidable and therefore need to be treated as 
contradictions or paradoxes.  As long as these cleavages 
could be kept invisible – and this was possible as long as 
GDR society was closed and there was no independent public – 
the GDR created the impression of being a stable state.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
we have the shamming of communicative relations in 
bureaucratically dessicated, coercively harmonised domains of 
pseudo-democratic will-formation.” (Habermas, 1982:283)  
 22
Alexei Yavchuk was himself, before emigrating to the US in 1989, 
part of the last Soviet generation which he investigates in his 
superb book Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More. He 
concludes (Yavchuk 2006:282): 
 
…the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union was completely 
unexpected by most Soviet people and yet, as soon as people 
realised that something unexpected was taking place, most of 
them also immediately realized that they had actually been 
prepared for that unexpected change… This complex succession 
of the unexpected and the unsurprising revealed a peculiar 
paradox at the core of the Soviet system.  For years that 
system managed to inhabit incommensurable positions: it was 
everlasting and steadily declining, full of vigor and 
bleakness, dedicated to high ideals and devoid of them.  None 
of these positions was a mask.  They were each real 
and…mutually constitutive.  Understanding this peculiar 
dynamic is crucial for our understanding of the nature of 
state socialism. 
 
Faced with this paradoxical situation, it is not surprising that 
commentators failed to predict the collapse. But the two examples 
just cited hold a clue to the failure. The Soviet Union was the 
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heart of the Empire, the GDR one of its most stable partners.25  
Closer attention to East Central Europe, where there was either a 
substantial reform movement underway as seen in Hungary and Poland 
or, as seen in Czechoslovakia, a more visceral if substantially 
still underground rejection of the regime, might have shown the 
international instability of the system which eventually brought 
it down.  Once the European empire was gone, it was surely clear 
that the Soviet Union was not long for this world.  And yet one of 
us, at least, was expecting a similar development in China.26  
For the Soviet Union, the imperial and international dimension was 
crucial: the intersection between changes initiated at the centre 
of the empire and those at the Western periphery.  If the Soviet 
Union had simply withdrawn from the European satellites, as it did 
from Afghanistan, this might in the end have provoked another 
version of the 1989 revolutions, but the ideological undermining 
of the old model in states like the GDR and Czechoslovakia which 
remained wedded to it was surely important too.  As von Beyme 
(1994:61) writes, there was a long-term and gradual delegitimation 
of the system, but it was „the international context – in 
                                                 
25
  An East German academic said to one of us in the 1980s that 
his was probably the country where Soviet colleagues felt most at 
home. 
26
  For a brilliant analysis of the differences between China 
and the Soviet Union and the way they worked out in the transition 
to capitalism in the two societies, see Tucker 2009.  
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particular the hesitation of the Soviet Union - which alone could 
explain the timing of the regimes‘ collapse“.   
 
 
And the two processes interacted with one another: the GDR’s last 
slogan, ‘socialism in the colours of the GDR’, is revealing of 
this dogged yet contradictory persistence of a regime which had 
always claimed that “learning from the Soviet Union means learning 
to win” (cf. Meuschel 1992:21).   
 
 The more substantial failure, however, was one of analysis 
rather than prediction, and returns us to fundamental issues on 
the methodology of social science. This was also the focus of von 
Beyme’s charge.  A brief comparison of two books published at more 
or less the same time may illustrate what was at stake.  David 
Lane and Felicity O’Dell’s The Soviet Industrial Worker (1978) 
explicitly based itself on published Soviet data. The authors 
noted that “Soviet researchers do not highlight conflict in their 
society, and often seek to reinforce their society’s 'legitimacy’, 
but also that ‘the uncritical acceptance of émigré and 
journalistic impressions about the Soviet Union has had an undue 
influence on the selection and framing of our knowledge about, and 
attitudes to, that country” (Ibid.:1-2).  Two years later, one of 
the doyens of Russian Studies, Leonard Schapiro, published (with 
Joseph Godson) an edited volume, The Soviet Worker (1981) made up 
substantially of the kind of work deplored by Lane and O’Dell.  
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Whereas Lane and O’Dell merely mentioned in passing (ibid.:32) the 
call by Vladimir Klebanov for an independent trade union, Schapiro 
and Godson dedicated their book to him and to Andrei Sakharov, 
‘fighters for freedom and free institutions’.  The titles of three 
of the chapters suggest the flavour of much of the book: “The End 
of an Illusion” (Schapiro), ”Eye-Witness to Failure” (Murray 
Seeger, formerly of the Moscow office of the Los Angeles Times and 
trade union officer) and “Society Without a Present” (Fyodor 
Turovsky, emigrant jurist and trade unionist).    
 
 The scholarly community, at least in the UK, seems to have 
responded more favourably to the second book.27  Mervyn Matthews 
(1979, 1982), who reviewed both, certainly took this view, 
commenting of Lane and O’Dell ”how strange it is that, six decades 
after the Revolution, writers should still be so ready to ignore 
profound failures of 'state socialism'.” (1979:457) Vladimir 
                                                 
27
  Paul Hollander (1983), writing in the US Information Agency’s 
tendentiously titled Problems of Communism, was particularly 
enthusiastic about the Schapiro and Godson collection and in 
particular the contributions of Seeger and Turovsky. Alec Nove 
(1981) confined himself to some qualifications to the general line 
of critique deployed in the book.  W. Teckenberg (1980) by 
contrast provided one of the more sympathetic reviews of Lane and 
O’Dell.  
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Andrle (1979) was even more acerbic in his reaction to the 
authors’ notion of the ‘incorporated’ Soviet worker.   
 
 This brief comparison suggests that the image of Western 
scholars accepting Soviet claims and assuming the long-term 
viability of the Soviet model is at best a half-truth. There is, 
if anything, an interesting contrast between the generally 
anticommunist tenor of most Western work on the Soviet bloc and 
the more sympathetic treatment of Chinese communist rule,28 which 
of course turned out to survive up to the present in a modified 
form and to preside over China’s recent transition to capitalism. 
In this case too, we would not venture to predict the likely 
outcome, nor to trace the fate of the predictions made for 
postcommunist societies in the 1990s. We have been concerned here 
merely to show that von Beyme’s ‘Black Friday’ for the social 
sciences was more a middling shade of grey.   
 
Conclusion 
We have argued, then, that the failure to predict the 1989 
revolutions was not due to naïve Schwärmerei of the Webb kind. 
Western specialists on the Soviet and Union and the communist area 
were notably more anti-regime than Sinologists – no doubt partly 
because the cold war was with the USSR rather than China.  This 
                                                 
28
  Gleason’s study of the concept of totalitarianism notes that 
it was little used by sinologists (Gleason, 1995:107).  
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fact however also generated a counter-tendency among scholars who 
did not wish to line up too loyally as ‘cold warriors’ behind the 
military priorities of the states in which they worked.  Something 
similar can be said for the theoretical and methodological 
approaches which dominated mainstream sovietology, or at least its 
sociological strand.  Functionalism may have reinforced 
sociologists’ complacency about their own societies, but it did 
not make them complacent about communist societies; it tended to 
be combined with theories of totalitarianism.  Totalitarian theory 
however came to seem overstated, especially with the partial 
reform of communist systems in the mid-1950s.  Theories of 
industrial society which often, though not always, went along with 
functionalism, reinforced a comparative approach which looked for 
similarities rather than stark contrasts. Finally, the ideals of 
value-free scholarship, rigour and the need for empirical data 
encouraged a charitable attitude to locally generated statistics 
and interpretations. Better suspect figures than none at all.   
 Most important, however, was the fact that these societies 
did function after a fashion, carefully presenting their best face 
to the outside world and discouraging whistle-blowing.  Like the 
Tay Bridge in Dundee, they worked until they fell down.  The 
failure was not so much a failure to predict the moment of 
collapse but to offer a more critical diagnosis of their 
unviability – one which required more speculative forms of social 
theory.   
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